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THE GLOBALIZATION ERA AND THE 

CONFLICT OF LAWS: WHAT EUROPE 

COULD LEARN FROM THE UNITED 

STATES AND VICE VERSA 

Milena Sterio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The conflict of laws, or private international law,1 has always 
been an area of scholarly disagreement. Choice of law rules tend 
to differ from state to state and often tend to encompass differing 
methodologies for different fields of law, such as tort law or con­
tracts. In Europe, traditional bilateral rules as developed by the 
great Savigny2 in the 19th century tends to persist. In the United 
States ("U.S."), on the contrary, scholars have long since aban­
doned the bilateral approach and have, since Currie's revolution­
ary writings in the 1960's,3 attempted to come up with "better," 
more substantive-law oriented, approaches. While the two conti­
nents seemed to have increasingly diverging points of view on the 
conflict of laws, two recent phenomena might bring them back 
together. 
First, Europe has been under the increasing influence of Euro­
pean Union ("E.U.") lawmakers, who have undertaken a harmoni­
zation movement attempting to somewhat unify member states' 
laws. The conflict of laws area has not escaped the harmonization 
movement and will become increasingly subject to Brussels's regu­
lations and directives. Thus, traditional bilateral rules will have to 
adapt themselves in light of the new political reality in Europe. 
Second, the conflicts field in general, be it in Europe or in the U.S., 
has been transformed under today's globalization trend. In other 
* Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. This Article represents the views of 
the author only and not necessarily those of her law firm. B.A., Rutgers College; J.D., 
Cornell Law School; Maitrise en Droit, Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne; D.E.A. 
(Master's Degree) in Private International Law, Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne. 
1 The terms "conflict of laws," "choice of law," and "private international law" will be 
used interchangeably throughout this article. While the first two terms are more com­
monly used in the U.S., the latter is frequently used in Europe and delineates conflict of 
both adjudicative and of prescriptive jurisdiction together. 
2 F. VoN SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DEs HEUTIGEN RoMISCHEN RECHTS (1849). 

3 CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS (1963). 
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words, with the rise of international commerce, traditional private 
law conflicts are being replaced by public regulations clashes in­
volving different states' economic or regulatory interests.4 Thus, 
the conflicts field might have to adapt itself both by trying to adopt 
universal rules, applicable on all continents, and by trying to adopt 
new methodologies capable of dealing with the complex conflicts 
situation of the global village. European bilateral rules are not 
likely to furnish interesting models, as they are already under at­
tack in Europe itself, and because they do not provide a basis for 
the application of foreign public law. However, two American 
choice of law models, one developed by Lea Brilmayer, and the 
other by Andrew Guzman, might provide some needed solutions. 
In order to address these issues, Part I of this Article will 
briefly discuss both Brilmayer's and Guzman's theories. Part II 
will then address the harmonization movement in Europe, and Part 
III will concentrate on the "publicization" of conflicts of law. Both 
Parts II and III will also discuss the possibility of adopting 
Brilmayer's and Guzman's theories in Europe as well as the U.S. as 
universal conflicts models capable of resolving modern-day legal 
system collisions. Finally, Part IV will discuss conflicts of economic 
regulations and the disappearing taboo of public law conflicts rules. 
I. MODERN SOLUTIONS: LEA BRILMAYER AND 

ANDREW GUZMAN 

American choice-of-law remains a largely incoherent field 
with different state rules and differing scholarly opinions and theo­
ries. However, two recent models present novel ideas and distance 
themselves from the Currie model or from any Currie-derived 
methodologies. These two models include Lea Brilmayer's politi­
cal rights theory and Andrew Guzman's economic law approach. 
A. Lea Brilmayer's Model 
Lea Brilmayer's political theory of the conflict of laws is a vig­
orous critique of Currie's governmental interests ideas. Brilmayer 
proposes a new model based on fairness. 5 First, regarding her cri­
4 This second phenomenon will be interchangeably described herein as "publicization" 
of private international law or disappearance of the public law taboo. The latter expres­
sion, "public law taboo," traditionally signified that in areas of public law, one country 
could not apply another country's public law. Thus, public law was "taboo" in terms of 
choosing the applicable public law. 
5 Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989). 
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tique of Currie, Lea Brilmayer underlines several problems in his 
methodology. According to Brilmayer, interests are impossible to 
ascertain and the whole process is unconstitutional. In fact, if one 
were to adopt one of the methodologies suggested by Currie's suc­
cessors, which consists of finding a state interest each time that a 
law specifies its own territorial domain, and if the notion of interest 
contains constitutional limits on the states' exercise of extraterrito­
rial jurisdiction, then all of the above laws would be unconstitu­
tional.6 Furthermore, according to Brilmayer, it is not always 
desirable to favor a substantial law policy over a conflict of law 
policy. A legislator could have very well chosen to apply a foreign 
law over his own law in order to foster conflict of law justice or 
procedural economy.7 Brilmayer further illustrates her point ac­
cording to which conflict rules should be as important as substan­
tive rules. She gives as an example, procedural rules, which can in 
themselves sometimes determine the outcome of a dispute. For ex­
ample, jurisdiction-selection or statute of limitation rules can some­
times prevent a claim from being introduced in a certain forum. 
These outcomes, although they may seem un-just in certain cases, 
are tolerated because procedural rules are deemed to be as impor­
tant as substantive rules.8 According to Brilmayer, conflict of law 
rules are as important as procedural rules, and, relative to substan­
tive rules, there is no need to systematically favor the latter. 
Lea Brilmayer then suggests an alternative. According to her 
political theory, a state cannot impose its authority and apply its 
laws to an individual unless the individual has consented to the 
state's authority either expressly or implicitly, or unless the appli­
cation of the state's laws is territorial, implying a tie between the 
state and the dispute.9 In other words, the individual waives his or 
6 Lea Brilmayer, 252 COLLECTED CouRsEs 9-252, at 11 (1995). Brilmayer refers to 
the definition of "interest" proposed by H.H. Kay, which implies a constitutional standard 
of limitation on the territorial application of each state's laws. Brilmayer then cites a para­
graph from Currie's writings, which seems to suggest that the legislator should specify the 
territorial reach of his own laws. From the two above remarks, Brilmay~r draws a constitu­
tional critique - if the legislator specifies the territorial reach of his own laws, but if at the 
same time there should be a constitutional limit on those laws' reach, then Currie was 
trying to incite the legislator to adopt anti-constitutional laws. However, this critique is 
somewhat tempered by Brilmayer herself, as the definition of "interest" is proposed by 
Kay and not by Currie. For Kay's theory, see H.H. Kay, A Defense of Currie's Govern­
mental Interest Analysis, 215 COLLECTED CouRsEs 9-204, at 13 (1989). 
7 Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 12. 
s Id. at 13. 
9 See Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, supra note 5, at 1298-1308. 
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her subjective rights. Instead of examining the privilege resulting 
from the application of a state's laws toward an individual, 
Brilmayer looks at the detrimental effects in order to examine the 
burden that application of the same laws can have on the other 
party. The authority and the foundation for the application of a 
state's laws lie exclusively within the individual's willingness, ex­
plicit or implicit, to subject himself to that authority. However, in 
order to make sure that this choice of law model remains fair, and 
to preserve distributive justice,10 Brilmayer introduces an addi­
tional test of mutuality designed to balance choice of law outcomes 
so as to avoid placing the burden systemically on the local party.11 
Although Brilmayer herself admits that traditional bilateral rules 
and the governmental interests model conform to the mutuality 
test,12 she discards those theories founded on states' interests in 
order to re-position the debate in terms of subjective rights of 
individuals.13 
Thus, Lea Brilmayer's political rights model embraces a new 
perspective on the choice of law and sheds new light on traditional 
conflicts ideas. 
B. Andrew Guzman's Model 
The modern American debate regarding the conflict of laws 
seems to have encompassed the rising globalization movement and 
the development of international commerce. In fact, the modern 
hypothetical situation examined by scholars no longer entails ve­
hicular accidents or spousal privileges. Instead, the current para­
digm focuses on economic disputes, on class actions in tort, or on 
consumer protection laws - all of which imply both international 
relations and extraterritorial application of a country's laws. In or­
der to provide an adequate solution to these new conflicts, modern 
10 The goal here is to establish a conflicts model that presents a burden to party A 
while according a benefit to party B. See Dirk H. Bliessener, Fairness and Choice of Law: 
A Critique of the Political Rights-Based Approach to the Conflict of Laws, 42 AM. J. CoMP. 
L. 687, 696 (1994). 
11 Id. at 697. ("To implement actuarial fairness in a choice of law model, Brilmayer 
proposes an additional test of 'mutuality.' The mutuality test is even more restrictive than 
actuarial fairness in that it requires a choice of law rule to be 'balanced on a case-by-case 
basis."'). 
12 Id. 
13 See id. For a European approach oriented toward individual subjective rights, see 
QuADRI, infra note 86. For an implication of Brilmayer's theory on the modern debate 
regarding the conflict of law, see infra Parts II and III. 
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scholars have focused their attention on economic aspects: grosso 
modo, how to efficiently allocate the territorial application of na­
tional laws to optimize the global welfare. In other words, scholars 
have focused on how to obtain economic efficiency through choice 
of law rules in order to maximize global wealth. 
The Law and Economics movement, developed mainly at the 
University of Chicago under Richard Posner's remarkable influ­
ence, seems to have implemented itself in conflict of laws theories. 
Notably, Andrew Guzman from the University of Berkeley,14 has 
developed such a school of thought. According to Guzman, differ­
ent states' interests need to be paralleled with those of the global 
community in order to provide for an optimal repartition of na­
tional laws for each international litigious situation. Because law­
suits are increasingly becoming international, it has become 
impossible to ignore the need for adapted choice of law rules. 
Without a better understanding of how international choice of 
law issues impact international business, the legal regime that 
governs such transactions will stand in the way of economic de­
velopment and growth rather than promote them.15 
Guzman's theory, founded on the quest for the optimization 
of global resources, adopts a new methodology based on the legis­
lative effect on individual welfare. Thus, the only relevant consider­
ations in the choice of law calculus are the ones having effects on 
such welfare. 
Adopting maximization of global welfare as the objective imme­
diately leads to the conclusion that the only basis of jurisdiction 
to be considered is the impact of rules on the welfare of individ­
uals. That is, factors that have no effect on human well-being 
are ignored.16 
Guzman thus develops a new conflicts model. First, he seeks 
to determine which substantive law is the most economically effi­
cient, or the "global optimum."17 Then, he analyzes different 
states' behavior, as each state adopts a certain substantive policy 
seeking to maximize its own fortune. In particular,Guzman exam­
14 Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, School of Law, Boalt Hall, U.C. 
Berkely Public Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 28 (1998), available at http:// 
www.ssm.com (last modified on November 8, 2000). 
1s Id. at 7. 
16 Id. at 14. 
17 Id. at 19. ("This is the set of substantive policies that would exist if a single benevo­
lent and well-informed global policy maker were able to establish laws.") 
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ines the relationship between the global optimum and different na­
tional laws in order to establish that only the application of the 
former would lead toward a satisfactory result in terms of maximiz­
ing the global welfare. This model somewhat resembles 
Brilmayer's quest for distributive justice: both authors strive to 
avoid potentially negative effects of a national law while seeking to 
balance the negative and the positive sides. In other words, the 
application of a particular law is justified even if it is prejudicial 
toward one party, if another party would benefit from it. The two 
authors' points of view differ, however, as Brilmayer looks more 
toward individual rights, whereas Guzman focuses on the economic 
aspect and global welfare. 
The Law and Economics movement's influence on American 
choice of law theory has been significant over the last decade, and 
scholarly enthusiasm over new models has recently blossomed. 
The American conflicts revolution has also had considerable influ­
ence on European choice of law scholars. However, traditional 
European rules are still in place, despite their inability to adapt to 
the new economic reality. In particular, two modern phenomena 
have been threatening the European equilibrium in the conflict of 
laws field. First, the E.U. has led a strong harmonization and unifi­
cation movement over national laws, seeking to create a federal 
union. The choice of law field might be obligated to follow the 
same harmonization logic. Second, conflicts of law are becoming 
increasingly public in nature. Thus, states' interests are increas­
ingly more involved in this new type of litigation. The traditional 
Savigny-developed model might be forced to adapt itself in light of 
the publicization of private international law. 
According to Lea Brilmayer, a state cannot exercise its adjudi­
cative or legislative authority unless the individual implied in the 
litigation has consented explicitly or implicitly to this state's au­
thority. The territorial reaches of different states' laws implied in a 
proceeding should be determined based on political fairness ex­
amined from the individual's point of view. Furthermore, accord­
ing to Andrew Guzman, the quest for the applicable law has to 
encompass global interests, in order to find the most economically 
efficient law and in order to foster global welfare. These new con­
flict of law theories could possibly find their place in the new Eu­
rope, harmonized and liberated of the public law taboo. 
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III. THE "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE:" HARMONIZATION 

AND CENTRALIZATION 

Niboyet, an influential European scholar in the field of con­
flict of laws from the beginning of the 20th century, advertised the 
development of a certain federal union in Europe.18 Europe 
should have developed pursuant to a territorial principle according 
to Niboyet. Countries should have abstained from applying their 
national laws extraterritorially in order to respect other countries' 
sovereignty. While the idea of constructing a federalized Europe 
does not seem novel to the modern-day E.U. authorities, the way 
that the latter have chosen to go about it differs significantly from 
Niboyet's territorial ideas. In fact, current E.U. leaders are press­
ing for a harmonization of national legal systems, a tendency that 
has equally affected the conflict of laws area. Examples of such 
harmonization include regulation of jurisdiction-selecting rules, 
mandatory laws, and enforcement proceedings. 
A. Adjudicative Jurisdiction or Jurisdiction-Selecting Rules 
First, with regard to adjudicative jurisdiction or jurisdiction­
selecting rules, E.U. regulation has replaced the existing treaty law 
in this field. The "Brussels I" Council Regulation of December 22, 
2000, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels I Regula­
tion"),19 which entered into force on March 1, 2002, among mem­
ber states of the European Union,20 has effectively replaced the 
Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968, on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
("Brussels Convention"),21 Europeanizing thereby a previously 
treaty-based field of law.22 The Brussels I Regulation is applicable 
in both civil and commercial matters, as long as the defendant is 
18 J.-P. Niboyet, L'universalite des reg/es de solutions des conflits est-elle realizable sur la 
base de la territorialite?, 1950 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 
[R.C.D.I.P.] 509 (1950). 
19 Council Regulation No. 44/2001, 2001 J.O. (L 012). 
2o Denmark has not ratified the Brussels I Regulation. The Brussels Convention thus 
remains applicable for Denmark. 
21 11 OJ. EuR. CoMM. 32 (No. L 299) (1968); for the text of the amended version, see 
21 0.J. EuR. CoMM. 77 (No. L 304) (1978). 
22 For a discussion of the "Europeanization" of the Brussels Convention, see Droz & 
Gaudemet-Tallon, La transformation de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968 
en Reglement du Conseil concernant la competence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et 
/'execution des decisions en matiere civile et commerciale, 2001 R.C.D.l.P. 601 (2001). 
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domiciled within the E.U.23 In other words, a dispute becomes 
"European" in nature if the party being sued is domiciled in E.U. 
territory, despite the fact that both plaintiff and defendant could be 
nationals of non-E.U. countries. The Brussels I Regulation effec­
tively eliminates the need for forum shopping by harmonizing juris­
dictional grounds among all E.U. countries. In fact, any E.U. 
tribunal should come to the same conclusion regarding its own as­
sumption of jurisdiction over a particular defendant if the dispute 
is "European" in nature. National jurisdictional grounds are thus 
superseded by the Brussels I Regulation. 
It should be noted, however, that the Brussels Convention, in 
force among E.U. member states before the adoption of the Brus­
sels I Regulation, had already harmonized jurisdictional grounds to 
some extent. Furthermore, under a 1971 Additional Protocol, the 
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") had been granted jurisdiction 
over all disputes arising under the Brussels Convention.24 The har­
monization movement, through the adoption of the above Brussels 
I Regulation, expands the ECJ's jurisdiction even further because 
this court now has automatic jurisdiction over all disputes in the 
field of adjudicative jurisdiction as this area of law has become 
"European."25 The adoption of new regulations in other areas of 
law might similarly expand the ECJ's jurisdiction, rendering its role 
comparable to that of the U.S. Supreme Court.26 
The role of the European Court of Justice, I take it, was inspired 
in large part by the experience of the United States Supreme 
Court ... [T]he basic function of the Court of Justice to see that 
member states do not impair the flow of goods and persons as 
mandated by the Treaty of Rome is consciously modeled on the 
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to review ac­
23 A dispute can also become "European" through the parties' intentions (see Article 
23), or through one of the situations mentioned in Article 22, which provides for exclusive 
jurisdiction. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19. 
24 See Brussels Convention, supra note 21. 
2s The ECJ's new jurisdiction has been instituted under Article 68 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. It has effectively taken away the national courts' right to ask for a preliminary 
ruling from the ECJ, a right that such courts had under the 1971 Additional Protocol. For 
a more detailed discussion on the change in the ECJ's jurisdiction powers since the entry 
into force of the Brussels I Regulation, see Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 22, at 
627. 
26 Regarding adjudicative jurisdiction, for example, nationality-based types of state ju­
risdiction have been eliminated for all disputes arising under the Brussels I Regulation. 
For example, in France, Article 14 can no longer be invoked against a defendant domiciled 
in the E.U. 
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tions that may interfere with the flow of interstate commerce 
27 
If the ECJ's jurisdiction is further expanded to include inter­
pretation of all regulated areas of law, such as adjudicative jurisdic­
tion, above and beyond its initial duties of supervising the free 
movement of goods and persons established in the Treaty Estab­
lishing the European Economic Community of 1957 ("Treaty of 
Rome"), then this court's similarity with the U.S. Supreme Court 
will become even more striking.28 A harmonized Europe operating 
under the supervision of a Supreme Court clearly parallels the U.S. 
federation, begging the question of whether such harmonization is 
also needed in the area of prescriptive jurisdiction or conflict of 
laws. 
B. Mandatory Laws or "Lois de Police" 
Second, the harmonization movement has already been under­
taken in other areas of law, such as mandatory laws. The ECJ has 
started to build a European regime of mandatory laws, or "lois de 
police," stemming from its interpretation of Article 7 of the Con­
vention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 1980 
("Rome Convention").29 In a non-E.U. dispute, a judge is free not 
to consider foreign countries' mandatory laws in light of the for­
eign law's purpose and of the dispute's nature. Furthermore, such a 
judge is also free to apply his own country's mandatory laws as he 
pleases. In a European proceeding, however, the ECJ mandates a 
proportionality requirement since its Arblade30 ruling: the forum's 
mandatory law, if it is neither lex contractus nor lex causae and if it 
wants itself applicable, has to nonetheless conform to certain E.U. 
27 Andreas Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An American's View of the 
European View of American Conflict of Laws, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 99, 108 (1982). 
2s It should be noted, though, that the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction 
over conflict of law issues. This area of law belongs to the common law of each state. 
Since the famous decision of Erie RR., Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts 
apply state law for all common law questions. The only possibility of acquiring Supreme 
Court jurisdiction in a conflict of law issue would be to allege a violation of the Due Pro­
cess Clause. See JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MuLTISTATE JusTicE 110-112 (1993). 
29 23 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 266) (1980). The ECJ does not have jurisdiction to 
interpret the Rome Convention because two 1988 protocols (C-27, 1988 O.J. 47 (1988)), 
providing for this possibility, never became effective. The issue nonetheless remains im­
portant in the conflicts arena regarding contractual matters, as long as the ECJ is compe­
tent to decide on the applicability of E.U. laws and regulations, which also affect 
international contracts. 
30 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/98, Arblade, 1999 ECR 1-8453 (1999). 
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standards.31 Under the Arblade holding, the applicability of a na­
tional mandatory law could prove to be harmful to the free ex­
change of goods as defined in E.U. law. In order for such a 
mandatory law to be applied, its purpose has to be one of general 
interest and its means have to be proportional to the goal that it 
seeks to accomplish. 
The proportionality criterion relates to the following scenario: 
an economic operator is subject to two different regulations which 
both have the same purpose; one in his home country and the other 
in his host country. The ECJ suggests the idea of mutual recogni­
tion as a solution to this situation. In other words, a host country 
should not be allowed to apply its national law if its purpose is 
already being fulfilled by the application of the home country rule. 
Thus, the applicability of mandatory laws changes drastically when 
the E. U. 's interior market is concerned. While a judge does not 
have to justify the application of his own country's mandatory rules 
in a non-E.U. dispute, the same outcome is not true for E.U. pro­
ceedings. The free movement of goods goal inherent in the Treaty 
of Rome trumps, to an extent, the application of the 1980 Rome 
Convention.32 
This new regime of mandatory laws is further detailed in the 
Mazzoleni33 decision, rendered by the ECJ on March 15, 2001. 
The issue in this decision centered around the comparison methods 
31 This case involved the posting of French workers to a work site in Belgium. The 
conflict of laws involved mandatory workers' protection laws of France and Belgium. 
Under Article 6 of the Rome Convention, a worker cannot be deprived of minimum stan­
dards, which are imposed under the laws governing their working contracts. The law gov­
erning the working contract is, under Article 6-2, the law of the place of performance, 
despite a temporary posting elsewhere. In this particular case, the workers were "pro­
tected" under French laws, as France was the regular place of performance under Article 6. 
The mandatory Belgian law, however, seemed applicable under Article 7-2. It should be 
noted that Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Decem­
ber 16, 1996, concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of ser­
vices was not applicable to this particular case, but that this fact did not have any 
importance on the case's outcome. See id. 
32 For another E.U. case discussing mandatory laws as they relate to commercial repre­
sentation, see Case C-381198, Ingmar, 2000 ECR I-9305 (2000). In the Ingmar decision, the 
ECJ decided on the applicability of mandatory laws derived from the Council Directive 86/ 
653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relat­
ing to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17). According to the ECJ, such 
mandatory rules are applicable whenever the case in chief has close ties to the Community 
[E.U.]. Id. Thus, agent-protective E.U. laws become mandatory laws or "lois de police" 
under Articles 7 and 16 respectively of the Rome Convention and the Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Agency of March 14, 1978 ("Hague Convention"). 
33 Case reprinted in 2 R.C.D.I.P. 495 (2001). 
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of national mandatory rules that clash in an Arblade-type scenario. 
The ECJ decided in Mazzoleni that the comparison should be 
global: in harmonized areas of law, minor disparities in national 
laws can no longer justify the non-applicability of a mandatory law 
that is globally equivalent to another law.34 
Following the above two decisions, the European Group for 
Private International Law35 suggested that a third paragraph be ad­
ded to Article 7 of the Rome Convention in order to reflect this 
new mandatory laws regime. According to this proposition, Article 
7-3 would read as follows: 
Effect may only be given to the mandatory rules of a Member 
State to the extent that their application does not constitute an 
unjustified restriction on the principles of freedom of movement 
provided for in the treaty. 
However, the latter proposition could prove to be insufficient be­
cause the Arblade and Mazzoleni holdings undermine the very 
purpose of conflict of law rules.36 In other words, the respect of 
E.U.'s free movement of goods principles might necessitate the 
elaboration of new conflict rules for relations among E.U. coun­
tries, while the already existing ones could remain applicable to 
relations with non-E.U. countries.37 The Rome Convention might 
have to be Europeanized as well in order to reflect the creation of 
a new European regime in the field of contracts. Other choice of 
34 The Mazzoleni case involved a conflict between a mandatory French law and 
mandatory Belgian law, which were both workers' protection laws. The events took place 
before the entry into force of the E.U. directive of December 16, 1996, concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. It should thus be noted 
that this type of mandatory law will be covered by E.U. laws and regulations in the future. 
35 The European Group for Private International Law is a European-based think-tank 
in the area of private international law. For more information on this group, see their 
website at http://www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip/default.html (last visited on Mar. 22, 2005). 
36 According to some authors, the ECJ reasoning in the Arblade, Ingmar and Maz­
zoleni decisions is dangerous because the goals of protecting the free market relied on in 
these decisions are over-broad, and because "to invoke such broad goals could render the 
notion of mandatory laws too vague, as all European regulations could somehow become 
linked to the E.U. Treaty goals." See Pataut (discussion of the Mazzoleni decision) (au­
thor's translation), 3 R.C.D.I.P. 495; see also, ldot, Les bases communautaires d'un droit 
prive europeen, reprinted in LE DRoIT PRIVE EuROPEEN 22 (Vareilles-Sommieres ed., 
1998). 
37 Pataut, supra note 36, at 495 (Pataut trans.) (According to Pataut, "we should now 
acknowledge that our substantive law encompasses mandatory laws of different sorts ('a 
geometrie variable'), the applicability of which will vary depending on whether the dis­
carded law is the law of a non-E.U. country or the law of an E.U. member state.") 
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law theories might have to be examined in order to meet the needs 
of a harmonized Europe. 
C. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
Third, European harmonization might also threaten existing 
choice of law rules in other fields, such as the recognition and en­
forcement of judgments. The 1968 Brussels Convention had al­
ready adopted a lighter enforcement regime for member countries 
in its Article 27.38 In fact, enforcement of a foreign judgment can 
only be challenged by fraud and/or disrespect of public policy, 
whereas the judgment's substantive merits are no longer re­
viewed.39 While Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights served until now as an additional control mechanism on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Europe,40 the 
new harmonization movement might make the entire contradiction 
moot. 
In other words, Article 41 of the Brussels I Regulation proce­
durally changes the enforcement regime of foreign judgments 
within the E.U. Under Article 27 of the Brussels Convention, the 
enforcement judge would automatically subject the foreign judg­
ment to fraud and public policy reviews. However, under Article 
41, such preliminary reviews no longer exist;41 if the judgment's en­
forcement is disputed, only then will such a judgment be reviewed 
by the enforcement judge under Article 33 of the Regulation.42 
38 Brussels Convention, supra note 21. 
39 It should be noted however that for certain types of jurisdiction, such as those stem­
ming from Article 16 or from articles destined to protect the weaker party, an automatic 
review of the foreign judgment by the enforcement judge is established under Article 28 of 
the Brussels Convention. See Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 22, at 644. 
40 See Kromback {dee.), no. C-7/98, March 28, 2000. This case involved a German judg­
ment which should have been enforceable in other countries under Article 27 of the Brus­
sels Convention, but which was nonetheless denied recognition because it was contrary to 
public policy under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
41 According to Article 41 of the Brussels I Regulation, "[t]he judgment shall be de­
clared enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53 without any 
review under Articles 34 and 35." According to Droz and Gaudemet-Talon, supra note 22, 
at 644, "there is no more substantive review of the presented decision, just a formal regu­
larity check." {Author's trans.). 
42 The wording of Article 33 of the Regulation is almost identical to Article 27 of the 
Brussels Convention. However, under Article 33, "[a] judgment given in a Member State 
shall be recognized in the other Member States without any special procedure being re­
quired. Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal 
issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 
of this Chapter, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognized." 
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This procedural change demonstrates the European orientation to­
ward the suppression of enforcement procedures altogether.43 The 
Brussels Commission had initially elaborated a project on the Eu­
ropean Enforcement Order, which was approved by the European 
Parliament on April 8, 2003, and then adopted by the European 
Commission on June 11, 2003.44 Under this project, the competent 
judge's decision could be executed anywhere within the E.U. with­
out further enforcement proceedings.45 The competent judge 
would thus do away with enforcement as well, which would in itself 
harmonize such proceedings in Europe by eliminating them 
altogether. 
D. E. U. Checks and Balances Over Member States' Choice of 

Law Rules 

The harmonization of national laws within the E.U. in the 
fields of adjudicative jurisdiction, mandatory laws, and enforce­
ment proceedings, demonstrates the current orientation of Euro­
pean decision-makers toward the federalization of European 
states. Traditional conflict of law rules might no longer work in this 
new federal model. Thus, conflict rules might have to be harmo­
nized themselves, supervised by a European authority, and made 
uniform within E.U. member states. Marc Fallon has said: 
As long as a disparity among national private laws can, the same 
as in the public law sector, prejudice free exchange, or as long as 
the Community has received the normative power to protect 
precise interests, such as those of the consumers, the elaboration 
of a Community-based private law becomes possible.46 
European authors have suggested different checks and bal­
ances mechanisms regarding the harmonization of national choice 
43 See Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 22, at 646 ("[M]aybe there is a remnant of 
the idea of a 'European enforcement order,' with the only difference that within the Regu­
lation's reach any national judgment will become a European enforcement order.") (Au­
thor's trans.). 
44 The original proposal was first sent to the European Parliament for its opinion on 
April 18, 2002. The European Parliament approved the European Commission's proposal 
subject to certain amendments on April 8, 2003, and the Commission adopted the 
amended proposal incorporating the uncontested amendments on June 11, 2003. See http:/ 
/europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133190.htm (last visited on Oct. 12, 2004). 
45 This procedure will only be available for certain types of uncontested claims. For a 
complete wording of this proposal, see http://europa.eu.int/cj/index.htm (last visited on 
Oct. 12, 2004). 
46 Marc Fallon, Les conflits de Lois et de juridictions dans un espace economique integre, 
253 COLLECTED COURSES 9-282, at 15 (1996). 
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of law rules. According to Marc Fallon, a national rule has to re­
spect four different conditions in order to be compatible with the 
European regime of free movement of goods, persons, and ser­
vices. Such a national rule has to remain subsidiary to any derived 
European regulations and has to have a legitimate purpose that is 
of a general interest. In addition, the national rule cannot be dis­
criminatory and must be proportional. Marc Fallon bases these 
four conditions on his interpretation of a famous ECJ holding in 
Cassis de Dijon, which instituted the home-country rule in the field 
of free movement of goods.47 Furthermore, according to Fallon, 
each national rule has to respect the principles of subsidiarity and 
non-discrimination, whereas the verification of the two other con­
ditions (legitimate purpose and proportionality) would only take 
place in particular cases, such as if a national rule is discriminatory 
or if a national rule affects product importation and relates only to 
product composition, but not to its sales particularities.48 
Regardless of the above discussion, any distinction between 
public and private law rules would be futile according to this au­
thor, as "the qualification of a rule as belonging to public law or to 
private law is irrelevant, as long as there is a threat to free ex­
changes under the European Community Treaty. "49 The above­
mentioned regime of E.U.-imposed checks and balances should 
therefore remain applicable to private choice of law rules because 
this regime is indifferent to the public-private law division.50 Fi­
nally, according to Falion, this controi mechanism over nationai 
choice of law rules would enhance and strengthen substantive val­
ues, underlying private international law, such as the encourage­
ment of the international movement of judgments and the 
protection of the "weak" party. The main goal should be, accord­
ing to this author, the "enhancement of fundamental rights of the 
47 Case 120178, "Cassis de Dijon," 1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979). According to Mr. Fallon, 
this case holding has been extended to the free movement of services in Case C-76/90, 
Sager, 1991 E.C.R 1-4221 (1991), and to the free movement of persons in Case C-106/91, 
Ramrath, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3351 (1992). See Fallon, supra note 46, at 120. 
4 8 According to Fallon, the above conclusion stems from the Keck case holding by the 
ECJ. See Fallon, supra note 46, at 15; see also infra note 75. 
4 9 Fallon, supra note 46, at 119. However, the same reasoning is not followed by other 
authors, who argue that overbroad interpretation of the Cassis de Dijon holding might lead 
toward the application of public law rules and standards to private law, which is unwar­
ranted. See Vincent Heuze, I J.C.P. 152 (2002). However, in light of the public law taboo 
disappearance, this debate becomes somewhat mooted. See infra Part III. 
so For problems regarding the application of the home country rule to conflict of laws, 
see Fallon, supra note 46, at 140-148. 
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individual, rights to conduct economic activities or rights to a bet­
ter quality of life."51 
Second, regarding the elaboration of uniform choice of law 
rules, according to Fallon, this approach remains workable as well, 
subject to certain institutional constraints, such as proof of neces­
sity for an E.U.-based initiative and choice of an appropriate in­
strument. Furthermore, according to Fallon, the E.U. zone should 
be delineated with precision, for both harmonized areas of regula­
tion and for the territorial reach of harmonized rules. Thus, E.U.­
derived choice of law rules could lead toward the elaboration of an 
interior market. For example, Fallon evokes recognition of judg­
ments inside the E.U. - an area of law largely influenced by E.U.­
led harmonization, as mentioned above. 
According to Fallon, a certain degree of differentiation among 
national substantive rules could also lead toward the realization of 
the interior market. That is, because the E.U. would never be able 
to develop a complete body of uniform substantive rules, the E.U. 
has limited itself since the "new approach"52 of the Single Euro­
pean Act53 to those different rules that could avoid ECJ censure. 
Such differences are "those related to national rules that have a 
legitimate purpose, are of general interest and are proportional."54 
The proportionality principle entails an equivalency test that im­
poses the application of the home country rule whenever two con­
flicting national rules are equivalent. Thus, the need to harmonize 
becomes almost moot as long as national rules are equivalent. 
In terms of private international law, the new approach could 
thus be defined as a limitation on the harmonization of substan­
tial law rules to the minimum/core, while leaving the rest to 
choice of law rules, as long as the designation of applicable law 
contributes to the goal of interior market realization. In other 
words, the EC legislator has been constrained, based on experi­
5 1 Id. at 148. The same type of considerations characterizes the thought process of Lea 
Brilmayer and her political theory of conflict of law. Brilmayer's ideas about individual 
consent as a basis of legislative jurisdiction are somewhat parallel to Fallon's E.U. checks 
and balances mechanism over national choice of law rules. Finally, the idea of E.U.-im­
posed control resembles the constitutional supervisory role played by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
52 Council Resolution of May 7, 1985, 1985 0.J. (C 136). 
53 Single European Act, 1997 O.J. (L 169). 
54 Fallon, supra note 46, at 212. 
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ence, to come back to a better method of reconciling jurisdic­
tional legal systems.55 
Fallon claims that the elaboration of a "European" private in­
ternational law is completely achievable through a European 
checks and balances mechanism over national choice of law rules 
and through harmonization of member countries' choice of law 
rules. Fallon has thus identified two significant contributions of 
European private international law to the general discipline of pri­
vate international law. First, in terms of the latter's content, Euro­
pean rules are applicable and exert control over both adjudicative 
and legislative jurisdiction rules. Second, European rules lead to­
ward the application of substantive or direct rules, and not choice 
of law rules.56 "The analysis of the 'acquis communautaire'57 shows 
that the possibility of establishing a European private international 
law is achievable, and the multitude of EC regulations would al­
ready allow for the elaboration of a European code."58 
One can only wonder about the similarities between the E.U. 
and the U.S. federation; the two "unions" are composed of differ­
ent states each having different private law rules. As different state 
laws cannot - or should not - be truly harmonized, only certain core 
areas of law are unified and the remaining rules are simply con­
trolled by federal bodies and courts. In Europe, certain fields have 
been harmonized, such as jurisdiction-selecting rules, mandatory 
laws, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Furthermore, 
the ECJ has been given the power and authority to control national 
rules with regard to the principles of proportionality and non-dis­
crimination. In the United States, federal law exists in certain areas 
of law, and constitutional norms, such as the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and the Due Process Clause, act as checks and balances 
mechanisms throughout the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
state laws. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 229-230. It should be noted that other scholars are actively debating the possi­
bility of establishing a European Civil Code. See e.g. Fauvarque-Causson, Code civil 
europeen, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 403, Pierre 
Legrand, Le sens et non-sens d'un Code civil europeen, 1996 R.l.D.C. 5319, Marc Fallon, 
493 MELANGES COLBERT 1993, Commentary of September 13, 2001, of the European 
Commission available at the European Commission website http://europa.eu.int/institu­
tions/comm/index_en.htm (last visited on March 22, 2005). 
57 "Acquis communautaire" is a French term that designates all of the already estab­
lished progress within the E.U., encompassing legislation promulgated by E.U. lawmakers. 
58 Fallon, supra note 46, at 229 (author's trans.). 
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The parallel between the European and American systems re­
mains schematic. However, the increased harmonization of na­
tional laws in the E.U. might diminish the differences between 
these two systems. Thus, Lea Brilmayer's or Andrew Guzman's 
"American" choice of law models might tum out useful in a har­
monized Europe. In other words, in order to harmonize and unify 
national choice of law rules within the E.U., one might look to one 
of these two models for appropriate solutions. If one were to fol­
low Lea Brilmayer, the conflicts solution in the E.U. context would 
entail focusing on the individual party to determine to which state's 
authority the individual has explicitly or implicitly consented. If 
one were to follow Andrew Guzman, the proper solution would be 
to find the optimal national law from the E.U. perspective, rather 
than from the perspective of any particular state. Regardless of the 
chosen model, the goal of harmonization would remain fulfilled. 
IV. 	 CONFLICTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONS AND THE PUBLIC 
LAW TABOO 
Despite the harmonization trend within the E.U., certain au­
thors have noted a tendency to maintain traditional bilateral choice 
of law rules in certain areas, such as public law economic regula­
tions.59 However, the border between private and public law has 
been greatly diminished in light of the massive development of ec­
onomic regulations in the 20th century. 
The assumption that the legal framework of international trans­
actions, investments, and markets can exhaustively be explained 
by the rules of private international law and some minimum 
standards of public international law has clearly shown to be 
erroneous.60 
Furthermore, according to Kurt Siehr, the European tendency 
to follow American authors, such as Currie or one of his succes­
sors, is even greater in the economic regulation domain.61 In light 
of the disappearance of the public law taboo in general, one could 
conclude that the choice of law rules of the two continents might 
become increasingly similar. As European scholars tend to toler­
ate functional choice of law theories in the field of economic regu­
lations, and as this field will certainly require elaborate and unified 
59 Jurgen Basedow, Conflicts of Economic Regulation, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 423 (1994). 

60 Id. at 423. 

61 Kurt Siehr, Domestic Relations in Europe: European Equivalents to American Revo 

lutions, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 37, 55 (1982). 
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choice of law rules, one might also conclude that traditional bilat­
eral choice of law rules will have to adapt themselves to this new 
globalized area of law. The choice of law rules' adaptation might 
be undertaken in the ways suggested by Lea Brilmayer or by An­
drew Guzman in their choice of law theories.62 
A. Conflict of Public Laws Paradigm 
A classical private international law scenario involves a car ac­
cident with victims coming from two or more different countries.63 
This scenario has been somewhat surpassed. The orientation of 
modem private international law is focused on conflicts of public 
law regulations and on a basis that would allow a judge to apply his 
own - and presumably foreign - laws extraterritorially. This type of 
conflict of laws is not novel in the United States and is being in­
creasingly developed in Europe. 
In the United States, conflicts of law that oppose American 
"public" law and foreign law are resolved under the Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law, and not under the Restatement of Con­
flict of Laws.64 Public law conflicts were first experienced in the 
U.S. in the area of antitrust law at the beginning of the 20th cen­
tury. The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed this issue in the 
American Banana v. United Fruit Co. decision,65 where it stated 
that U.S. laws should apply territorially, even if the effects of for­
eign wrongdoing were experienced on U.S. territory. The shy ap­
proach of the U.S. Supreme Court was abandoned in the Alcoa66 
holding, as territorial application of American laws no longer cor­
responded to the economic reality. Thus, the Alcoa decision pro­
vided for extraterritorial application of U.S. laws so long as two 
62 See supra Part I. 
63 For example, this fact pattern was involved in the Lautour case in France, Civ. May 
25, 1948, 1949 R.C.D.l.P. 89, note Battifol, and in the Babcock v. Jackson case in the U.S., 
12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963). 
6 4 The mere existence of two Restatements demonstrates the traditional ideas accord­
ing to which the same criteria could not be used to resolve public and private law conflicts. 
However, the distinction between private and public law is less important in common law 
countries than in civil law countries. For example, in the U.S., this distinction has been 
greatly diminished through the Legal Realism movement at the beginning of the 20th cen­
tury. Furthermore, a conflict paradigm involving American public law regulations and for­
eign public law is analyzed under the concept of extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
and not as a traditional conflict of laws situation. 
65 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
66 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945) [hereinaf­
ter Alcoa]. 
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conditions were met. First, the alleged wrongdoing which took 
place abroad had to have taken place with the intention to burden 
U.S. interests. Second, the same wrongdoing had to produce a di­
rect effect in the U.S. The Alcoa holding gave birth to the so­
called effects doctrine, as the affected market obtained the judicial 
green light to apply its laws to conduct situated abroad.67 
In order to temper the aggressive application of the lex Jori, 
the U.S. Supreme Court further held in its Aramco68 decision that 
extraterritorial application of American laws should be limited to 
situations where the legislative intent behind the relevant law 
clearly pointed to extraterritorial application of the same law. Fi­
nally, in its famous holding in Hartford Fire,69 the Supreme Court 
avoided this issue and decided to apply American law extraterrito­
rially because, according to the majority, there was no real conflict 
at stake.70 In other words, only U.S. law was restrictive in this case 
and was not in conflict with a merely permissive British law. Im­
plicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court went back to the effects doctrine, 
as in Hartford Fire where the foreign wrongdoing clearly targeted 
the U.S. market. Finally, Sections 415 and 403(2) of the Third Re­
statement on the Foreign Relations Law71 recognize a list of scena­
rios where a judge can apply his own laws extraterritorially, under 
the guise of "reasonableness," which is applicable to each hypothe­
67 It could be argued that the Alcoa reasoning is nationalist, as it looks only to Ameri­
can interests in order to justify the application of U.S. law, without examining other coun­
tries' interests implied in the litigation. Thus, it might be preferable to use the 
"reasonableness" test of the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. See infra note 
71, for an explanation of the reasonableness test. 
68 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company, 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
69 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
70 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire argues against this approach. Ac­
cording to Justice Scalia, the real issue was whether the U.S. Congress had the intent to 
apply U.S. law, in this case the Sherman Act, extraterritorially. Congress acts in respect of 
public international law. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, there are two rules of interpre­
tation regarding national law: one stemming from ARAMCO implying a presumption 
against extraterritoriality, and the other stemming from public international law, according 
to which national law should be interpreted in respect of public international law. Accord­
ing to Justice Scalia, public international law allows for the extraterritorial application of a 
national law if this is reasonable. The second interpretation rule points in this case against 
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, as this would not be reasonable and as 
it would violate public international law, which would be contrary to the second rule of 
interpretation. For another example of case law referring to "comity" under public inter­
national law with regard to the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, see 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N. T. & S.A., 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
§§ 415, 403(2) (1987). 
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sis, including the effects doctrine.72 The Restatement's approach is 
thus more moderate than American case law, as the Restatement's 
approach recognizes the effects doctrine only if other countries' in­
terests are respected, that is, through its acceptance of the reasona­
bleness test inherent in public international law. 
In Europe, the effects doctrine has never been officially recog­
nized, but it has been used in case law. Most notably, it was used in 
the ECJ's Woodpulp73 case. In Woodpulp, the ECJ recognized the 
possibility of applying European law to conduct located abroad 
which clearly targeted the European market. The narrow holding 
by the ECJ might be explained by the fact that the ECJ sought to 
avoid ruling on a public choice of law issue as public law tradition­
ally stands for territorial application of one country's laws. None­
theless, both the ECJ's ruling in the Woodpulp case and the Third 
Restatement demonstrate that the effects doctrine has soundly em­
bedded itself in the field of public law conflicts. Thus, the public 
law domain seems to provide similar choice of law solutions on 
both continents, a phenomenon which might lead toward a certain 
unification of choice of law rules in this area. 
The opinio iuris as reflected by national legislation obviously 
shifts towards the recognition of the effects doctrine, and this 
cannot go unnoticed when rules of customary international law 
are discussed.74 
72 
"Reasonableness" implies a notion of fairness in public international law. In other 
words, a state can only assert extraterritorial jurisdiction if this is "reasonable" and justi­
fied, and if this doesn't interfere with other states' interests in a disproportionate manner. 
The list of considerations to take into account in deciding whether exercising jurisdiction is 
reasonable for a state includes: 
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory [of the regulat­
ing state]; the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, 
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the ac­
tivity to be regulated; the character of the activity to be regulated, the impor­
tance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states 
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regula­
tion is generally accepted; the extent to which another state may have an inter­
est in regulating the activity; the likelihood of conflict with regulation by 
another state. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 403 (1987). It should be noted that the above list is not 
exhaustive. 
73 Joined cases 89/85, Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5233, 5246 (1988). 
74 Basedow, supra note 59, at 432. 
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B. The Necessity for Different Choice of Law Rules 
The choice of law rules used to adjudicate economic regula­
tions' conflicts is thus different from the traditional Savigny-devel­
oped rules. The inconvenience created for economic operators 
from this paradigm stems from the cumulative application of many 
potential laws. In other words, because the effects doctrine dic­
tates a unilateral application of one country's laws, it puts the eco­
nomic operator at the mercy of that country's laws as long as his 
conduct somehow affects that country. Thus, economic operators 
are potentially subject to several countries' regulations and laws. 
Within the E.U., the ECJ has somewhat moderated this approach 
through the adoption of the home country rule. However, this so­
lution remains contentious both with European scholars and within 
the same court.75 Furthermore, it should be noted that relations 
between E.U. countries and non-E.U. countries are not subject to 
the home-country rule. Thus, certain authors have suggested the 
establishment of bilateral choice of law rules in the field of eco­
nomic regulations. 
For example, Andreas Bucher suggests reconsidering the pur­
pose and the content of bilateral rules in order to adapt them to 
socio-economic needs.76 According to this author, an example of 
such rules would be Article 137 of Swiss Private International Law, 
under which, in antitrust law, a damages claim based on conduct 
which occurred abroad should be resolved under the foreign coun­
try's laws. In the same manner, Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Con­
vention reflect the same idea of integrating the law's final purpose 
in the choice of law mechanism. However, the establishment of 
such bilateral rules is not desirable in all areas of law.77 For exam­
ple, in the field of economic regulations a judge applies his own law 
as an agent of the state. Private interests, on the contrary, dictate 
the application of foreign law. In fact, bilateral rules in this area of 
75 Some European scholars, such as Vincent Heuze in France, are generally hostile to 
the idea of expanding the Cassis de Dijon holding to the area of conflict of laws. Further­
more, the holding in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268-91, Keck, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097, has 
modified the holding of Cassis de Dijon according to the same author. 
76 See Andreas Bucher, L'ordre public et le but social des lois en droit international 
prive, II COLLECTED CouRsEs 19, The Hague, (1993). 
77 Basedow recognizes two types of situations where bilateral rules persist: first, if the 
substantive policy behind a regulation can be fulfilled if the regulation's domain is limited 
to intra-state situations, such as in the case of consumer and worker protection laws; sec­
ond, in situations where states have accepted the political economy of other states, such as 
in the context of a treaty or a union, like the E.U. Basedow, supra note 59, at 443-444. 
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law do not provide for a basis for the application of foreign law. 
"In a more practical sense the theory of bilateralisation cannot ex­
plain why the foreign anti-trust law indicates an intention to be 
applied should be decisive ...."78 
According to Basedow, the solution to economic regulations 
conflicts can be found in the adaptation of unilateral rules so that 
they can also provide for the application of foreign economic laws. 
For example, Article 7-1 of the Rome Convention allows a judge to 
take into account foreign laws. Under a similar logic, according to 
Basedow, Article 7-1 reasoning should be applied to economic reg­
ulations that are the lex causae.79 Furthermore, the Third Restate­
ment of Foreign Relations Law allows the competent judge to 
examine other laws' applicability, including foreign economic laws 
and the legislative interest behind those laws. Because bilateral 
rules are ill-suited for public law conflicts and because there is a 
need to find clear solutions in order to foster international com­
merce, public law conflicts should be analyzed separately from pri­
vate law ones. In order to develop a new system of conflict of law 
rules for public law clashes, several solutions are possible. Accord­
ing to Basedow, already existing unilateral rules should be adapted. 
However, the solutions suggested by Lea Brilmayer and Andrew 
Guzman look appealing too. 
First, Lea Brilmayer's model might become appropriate for 
several reasons. In public law conflicts, the application of the lex 
fori tends to promote the state's interests. On the other hand, the 
application of foreign law tends to promote individual justice and 
parties' foreseeability, both of which are goals of private conflict of 
law rules. 
The same goal of individual justice and legal certainly prevails 
when it comes to the application of foreign economic law; its 
primary function is the harmony of decisions, the avoidance of 
conflicts of obligations for the parties concerned, and the re­
spect for the parties' expectations with regard to the applicable 
law.80 
If one were to follow the above logic, it would seem more ap­
propriate to look to the economic operators' expectations to deter­
mine where they could have foreseen being sued. According to 
Brilmayer, the application of a certain law toward an individual can 
78 Id. at 440. 
79 Id. at 442. 
so Id. at 438. 
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be justified either by the individual's consent or by territoriality.81 
The individual is supposed to have consented to the legislative au­
thority of a certain country through an express accord or through 
certain types of conduct from which such consent can be implied. 
Under Brilmayer's terminology, an individual thus waives his or his 
subjective rights.82 In the economic arena, where the effects doc­
trine already operates, one could thus imagine subjecting economic 
operators to laws to which they have availed themselves volunta­
rily. In other words, one could consider that parties to an illegal 
pricing scheme have renounced their subjective rights to be left 
alone83 and that they implicitly consented to the legislative author­
ity of all countries that are affected by their illegal conduct. In­
stead of looking at the effects, one would thus look at the intention 
of the alleged wrongdoing; instead of looking at the damages, one 
would look at the cause of the same wrongdoing. 
It should be noted however that Ms. Brilmayer's theory im­
plies a reciprocity test, which is meant to assure a certain fairness in 
the application of different states' laws. The reciprocity require­
ment somewhat resembles the reasonableness requirement inher­
ent in the Third Restatement and in some case law.84 This logic, 
already present in the U.S., seems fully exportable to Europe, at 
least in the economic domain.85 In light of the disappearance of 
the public law taboo, nothing stands in the way of extending the 
81 See Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 1298-1308. 
82 Another basis of jurisdiction is territoriality, implying a connection between the reg­
ulating state and the victim in a litigation proceeding. See Bliessener, supra note 10, at 696. 
83 According to Brilmayer, there is a negative political right to be "left alone," which 
imposes a limit on the state's exercise of its substantive legislative policy. Bliesener, supra 
note 10, at 693. 
84 See, e.g., Alcoa v. U.S., 148 F.2d at 416; and Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597; see also 
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 764. 
85 According to German scholars, the ECJ's Centros holding of March 9, 1999, case C­
212/97, reasons in terms of individual rights. This case involved the possibility for a Danish 
couple to open a subsidiary of their United Kingdom-based company in Denmark. The 
couple's company was based in the United Kingdom solely to avoid heavy taxation im­
posed in Denmark. Denmark refused the registration of the couple's subsidiary because 
the mother company's activities were going to be exercised in Denmark and because the 
scheme constituted fraud under Danish law. This refusal was deemed incompatible with 
articles 52 and 58 of the Rome Treaty according to the ECJ because of liberty of establish­
ment. According to German scholars, the case involved a right to "justification" for the 
parties. See Christian Joerges, On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe's Private Law: 
Considerations on a Law of Justification for the E. U. Multi-Level System, Symposium, Eu­
ropean University Institute (2002). The same reasoning that looks to individual rights is 
similar to Brilmayer's theory of "waivers" and of the right to be left alone. 
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same logic to the choice of law field, as some European authors 
had suggested decades ago.86 
Some authors disagree with Brilmayer's ideas. In particular, 
Bliessener underlines the contradiction between the systematic al­
location of burdens to the local party in order to protect the for­
eign party's right to be left alone and the reciprocity requirement, 
which is meant to accomplish a goal of distributive justice, but 
which is contrary to the burden allocation system. According to 
Bliessener, this model, which is based on privileges accorded to the 
foreign party in the name of respect of his or her negative rights, 
implies a rule-selecting methodology, whereas the reciprocity re­
quirement elaborated to correct the same model implies a jurisdic­
tion-selecting methodology. Because the two methodologies are 
incompatible, Brilmayer's model is incoherent and contradictory. 
Bleissener critiques as follows: 
The so-called 'negative rights' or 'rights to be left alone' play a 
pivotal role in her theory of political obligation for choice of 
law. She concedes the rule-selecting nature and, accordingly, 
the redistributive result of the negative rights-based approach 
. . . One part of her model suggest a rule-selecting, the other 
takes a jurisdiction-selecting, approach to choice of law. One 
part leads to redistributive result to the disadvantage of the local 
party, the other pretends to cure this result and so tum it upside 
down. One part of her model asserts a political fairness stan­
dard, the other denies this very standard on behalf of fairness. 87 
The above critique by Bliessener seems coherent. However, 
Bliessener positions himself in an entirely private law logic, which 
takes into account individual claimants but not the states' interests. 
Negative rights presented by Brilmayer and critiqued by Mr. Blies­
sener are about individual equality and fairness from a personal 
perspective. From a public law perspective, however, the negative 
right to be left alone relates not only to the economic operator but 
also to his home country. Furthermore, Bliessener's critique is 
confined to an internal logic, or in other words, to American intra­
state conflicts. In the context of publicized private international 
law, however, conflicts occur among international economic regu­
86 Rolando Quadri had suggested an expectations theory, under which one looks to the 
individual's expectations to see whether the individual could have reasonably foreseen the 
applicability of a certain country's laws toward him. See generally ROLANDO QuADRI, 
LEZIONI DI DIRITIO lNTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (1965). 
87 Bliessener, supra note 10, at 698. 
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lations. This type of conflict implies both states' interests and the 
inevitable influence of public international law. Thus, the reciproc­
ity requirement underlines the necessity to respect other countries' 
sovereignty and to impose one's own legislation only if it is reason­
able from a global perspective, as the Third Restatement sug­
gests.88 The two considerations - the respect of negative rights and 
the reciprocity requirement among countries - are no longer con­
tradictory in a public law conflict situation. Lea Brilmayer's theory 
thus becomes more important in the modern conflict of law area, 
as it is universal and as it permits a "rapprochement" between the 
European and the American continents. 
Second, Andrew Guzman's theory is equally important. Mod­
ern conflicts of public law often involve antitrust laws and other 
types of economic and financial regulations. The type of interest 
involved is often economic and focuses on the affected market or 
country. This paradigm is exactly the one in which Andrew Guz­
man develops his economic theory.89 In other words, Guzman's 
theory is aimed at resolving such conflicts in order to obtain the 
global optimum, by explaining to the affected country that its own 
laws might not be the most efficient globally. Guzman might not 
call this "reasonableness" as does the Third Restatement on For­
eign Laws, but his quest for the global optimum underlies an eco­
nomic reasonableness. Guzman's reasoning works at its best in a 
public law setting, where interests are governmental or economic, 
and where relations are international and no longer domestic. 
Furthermore, the effects doctrine has somewhat embedded it­
self in this field both in Europe and in the United States. Guz­
man's model would correct the effects doctrine by embracing an 
economic reasonableness into it and by focusing on global, and not 
national, effects. As Europe has been more willing to abandon 
traditional bilateral rules in the public law context, and as the U.S. 
has somewhat accepted this type of reasoning regarding public law 
conflicts,90 Guzman's model might be more easily accepted in mod­
ern-day conflict of laws on both continents. Thus, Andrew Guz­
man's theory might unify European and American conflicts of law 
88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 71, at § 403. 
89 See supra Part I. B. 
90 In the antitrust area, American case law has already embraced the effects doctrine. 
See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 764; see also Alcoa v. U.S., 148 F.2d at 416. Further­
more, reasonableness is already inherent in the American RESTATEMENT (THIRD), see 
supra note 71, and in some case law, see Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597. 
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in order to address the need for new conflict rules in a publicized 
private international law arena. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a general matter, American influence in Europe in the field 
of conflict of laws is more than evident in both traditional private 
international law as well as in the more modern, E.U.-influenced 
and publicized one. According to Siehr, three European tenden­
cies have been developed under American influence: a case-by­
case approach allowing distinctions between each individual situa­
tion; a notion of material justice through the restrained better-law 
approach present in certain European treaties; and a predomi­
nance accorded to domestic law if this law has important ties to the 
relevant dispute.91 It seems logical to conclude that the two trans­
atlantic methodologies have been mutually beneficial to one 
another. 
We Americans could profit from your conceptual prowess, your 
ability to turn thoughts into statutes, your penchant for elegant 
simplicity. We, in turn, can offer an emporium of hard-won em­
pirical lessons. You Europeans call law a science. Let us then 
proceed in the spirit of scientific inquiry rather than to keep re­
citing the mantras learned from old masters.92 
Will choice of law ideas become more similar in the U.S. and 
in Europe over time? Certain authors are hesitant to embrace this 
notion.93 However, such an evolution seems inevitable in light of 
the evolution of modern private international law. Most notable is 
the harmonization within the E.U. and the disappearance of the 
public law taboo. Traditional bilateral rules, as described above, 
are not likely to furnish helpful solutions because of both their vul­
nerability in front of Brussels lawmakers and because of their in­
ability to justify the application of foreign public law. Thus, Lea 
91 See Siehr, supra note 61, at 71. 
92 JUENGER, supra note 28, at 133. 
9 3 See Lowenfeld, supra note 27, at 115 ("It seems to me that choice of law is an inter­
esting but not an orderly field, and I like it that way. I am quite prepared to live without a 
unified system, provided there is a scope for imagination, subtlety, advocacy and persua­
sion. If we conflicts lawyers can share those aptitudes across the ocean that unites us, I 
think we have nothing to be ashamed of."). See also Bernard Hanotiau, The American 
Conflicts Revolution and European Tort Choice of Law Thinking, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 
96-97 (1982). Hanotiau concludes that the theory of governmental interests is an Ameri­
can product and cannot be exported in Europe. However, the same conclusion does not 
necessarily apply to other theories or to Lea Brilmayer's and Andrew Guzman's models. 
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Brilmayer's and Andrew Guzman's choice of law models might 
provide useful ideas in the quest for more unified and universally­
accepted solutions. 
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